[the barbiturate] that would render the prisoner unconscious, there is a substantial, constitutionally unacceptable risk of suffocation from the administration of pancuronium bromide and pain from the injection of potassium chloride." 15 If the procedure is administered correctly, the unconscious inmate will not feel the effects of the second and third drugs. However, potential problems can cause inadequate delivery of the anesthesia. First, a team member must correctly mix the anesthetic solution. Multiple powder kits of the barbiturate must be mixed separately with solution and drawn to multiple syringes. 16 Inappropriate concentrations can cause inadequate anesthetization. 17 Members of California's execution team admitted in testimony that when mixing the drugs they "fail[ed] to follow the simple directions provided by the manufacturer of sodium thiopental." 18 According to the federal district court, this admission "complicate [d] [its] inquiry as to whether inmates being executed have been sufficiently anesthetized." 19 Second, if the intravenous catheter is incorrectly inserted or becomes dislodged, the inmate might not be rendered unconscious by the barbiturate, yet the pancuronium bromide will have its intended paralytic effect if delivered subcutaneously or intramuscularly. 20 The risk of improper catheter placement and consequent infiltration into surrounding tissue is particularly worrisome with some inmates whose veins have been damaged by drug addiction. 21 Moreover, the catheter could "blow out" if the drugs are delivered too quickly, with too much force; 22 different drugs have different proper delivery rates. 23 Risks to the inmate are more serious where the personnel monitoring his consciousness are unable to assess anesthetic depth competently because they lack training. 24 During the Baze v. Rees litigation, the Kentucky prison warden who monitors inmates during execution "candidly admitted: 'I honestly don't know what you'd look for.'" 25 Other commentary and court opinions discuss additional potential problems. 26 However, our discussion thus far provides sufficient reason to see why Justice Alito observed that the participation of medical professionals trained in anesthesia would minimize the risk of unnecessary pain. 27 A well-trained anesthesiologist will have significant experience and expertise in drug preparation, catheter insertion, drug delivery, and consciousness monitoring.
To eliminate the risk of suffocation and torturous pain, a handful of states have eliminated pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride, choosing to execute with a barbiturate overdose. 28 The remainder of this article, though, will assume a three-drug protocol when discussing lethal injection. A switch to a one-drug protocol could affect the ethical analysis of physician participation. To illustrate, one might argue that with a three-drug protocol, a physician participates not to kill but to ensure proper anesthesia delivery; but with a one-drug protocol, the distinction collapses between delivering anesthesia and the death-causing drug. But we will assume a three-drug protocol for two reasons: first, the vast majority of capital jurisdictions maintain it; 29 and second, assessing that context should be fruitful to reflection on general moral criteria for physician participation in other non-clinical-care activities, such as forensic psychiatry and military interrogations.
Physician Participation: Current Codes, Laws, and Practices
The American Medical Association (AMA), World Medical Association, General Assembly, American College of Physicians, American Public Health Association, and American Society of Anesthesiologists all condemn physician participation. 30 The American Nurses Association, the American Academy of Physician Assistants, and the National Association of Emergency
Medical Technicians also concur with respect to their respective professions. 31 According to the AMA, participation includes any act which would directly cause death, would assist or supervise another person in directly causing death, or could "automatically cause an execution to be carried out." 32 Specifically, the AMA Code of Ethics prohibits prescribing the drugs, choosing injection sites, inserting the IV line, inspecting the lethal injection equipment, monitoring the inmate's vital signs, and consulting and advising the execution team. According to her findings, adjusted slightly for the subsequent abolishment of the death penalty in New Jersey, New Mexico, and Illinois, more than half of death penalty statutory schemes contemplate the potential presence of a physician at an execution, and more than 40 percent state that a physician shall pronounce or certify death. 34 Many states also protect physicians who participate from state medical board disciplinary action. 35 Even where physicians are not required, states employ other medical professionals whose professional organizations also condemn involvement. 36 Therefore, it should not surprise that physicians are participating. 37 During litigation in 2008, Missouri's Department of Corrections informed the court that its execution team includes an anesthesiologist. 38 In Alabama litigation, an affidavit submitted by the senior warden in charge of executions verified that a "medical doctor is on hand to establish a central venous catheter" in case EMTs are unable to establish a peripheral live. 39 Atul Gawande's well-known article in the New England Journal of Medicine reports interviews with three doctors and a nurse who admitted (all anonymously except for one) to participation. 40 In addition, doctors have testified in proceedings regarding the efficacy of the drugs, 41 which arguably violates the AMA's prohibition on actions "which would assist … the ability of another individual to directly cause the death." 42 The litigation regarding execution protocols has reinvigorated the ethical debate about physician participation, to which we now turn.
The Standard Medical Ethics Approach: Separating the Issues
The AMA maintains that its ethical rejection of physician participation is not based on any condemnation of capital punishment. It deems the death penalty's moral status irrelevant to the physician issue:
An individual's opinion on capital punishment is the personal moral decision of the individual. A physician, as a member of a profession dedicated to preserving life when there is hope of doing so, should not be a participant in an execution.
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The AMA claims that even if an individual doctor thinks the death penalty is required by justice, she should nonetheless conclude that her involvement would be immoral. In 1994, the American College of Physicians and Physicians for Human Rights co-authored with two other organizations a report which condemned physician participation. 44 The first page states explicitly that each co-authoring organization "has different viewpoints on the death penalty itself, and all members agreed that this report would not take a position supporting or opposing capital punishment." 45 Similarly, the president of the American Society of Anesthesiologists, in a letter to its members, stated that his subject was "the involvement of anesthesiologists in lethal 
Assessing Arguments Against Physician Participation

Respecting the Prisoner
The core of medical professional ethics requires physicians to provide competent medical service while exhibiting compassion and respect for human life and dignity. 52 The World Medical First, although death may ensue from the physician's actions, the individual patient is voluntarily choosing to risk death upon the withdrawal or withholding of care. With capital punishment, the physician is causing death against the will of the individual. Second, when life-sustaining treatment is discontinued, the patient's death is caused primarily by the underlying disease; with capital punishment, the lethal injection causes the prisoner's death.
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The first response regards the respect owed to the inmate as a person, but is unpersuasive. Its premise is that a dying patient may voluntarily choose to cease treatment but a condemned inmate does not choose execution. That is true, but the analogy is inapposite. The dying patient has not chosen her disease but chooses to ask her physician to withhold treatment. The condemned inmate has not chosen execution but could choose to ask a physician to monitor his consciousness. In the patient scenario, the disease is a given, a background condition to her choice; in the inmate scenario, the sentence is given, a background condition to his possible Let us return to the execution context and stipulate that a physician's participation would qualify as a but-for cause of death. Now ask whether the primary cause of death was the inmate's sentence (along with the intent of state actors to carry it out), the lethal injection, or the involvement of a physician whose intention is to minimize the risk of pain? Any answer to that question is necessarily colored by an opinion about the physician's obligations. To say that the physician's involvement in the lethal injection is the primary cause of death is to already assume a moral view about the physician's obligations. As such, the "primary cause" notion cannot do any moral work in establishing the physician's moral obligation to refrain from participation.
"This Is Not a Medical Procedure"
Many arguments regarding physician participation in controversial non-clinical-care settings share an interesting premise: that the controversial use of medical skills and knowledge does not count as the practice of medicine. Others argue similarly that when using her skills for a social purpose, the physician does not act as a physician. 61 Strangely, commentators draw opposing conclusions from these premises. To some, the premises imply that physicians may participate, even if their skills are used to harm an individual. For these commentators, lethal injection's status outside medical practice does not make it unethical; its non-medical status implies that the Hippocratic ethic is inapplicable. Jay Chapman, the Oklahoma physician who fathered current lethal injection protocols, made this exact argument. 62 Similarly, David Tornberg, Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, argues that military physicians who help devise interrogation techniques do not breach medical ethics because they "act as combatants, not physicians, when they put their knowledge to use for military ends." 63 Opposing commentators argue that physicians may not participate if the controversial activity is outside medical practice because physician skills may not be employed for nonmedical purposes. For example, the American College of Physicians and its institutional coauthors condemn physician involvement because "execution is not a medical procedure, and is not within the scope of medical practice." 64 Linda Emanuel and Leigh Bienen state, "Execution facilities are chillingly clinical in appearance, but lethal injection is no more a medical procedure than is killing with a knife or a gun." 65 Truog and Brennan argue similarly, asserting that an execution "lies far outside the medical sphere."
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Why would these commentators describe lethal injection as a non-medical procedure?
After all, as Emanuel and Bienen observe, much about the setting looks medical: syringes, intravenous lines, drugs, and, often, medical professionals. Plus, the reason physicians are asked to participate is because they possess medical skills and knowledge and, perhaps, the "cultural authority" that accompanies them. 67 Let us assess two proposals that could explain the claim that physician participation is unethical because it is non-medical.
An Alleged Morality Internal to Medicine
Edmund Pellegrino offers one response. He famously argues that the essence of medicine is defined by the good at which it aims, which, on his account, is healing. We perceive medicine's essence when we reflect upon the clinical encounter where the lives of the vulnerable patient and knowledgeable physician intersect. According to Pellegrino, whether the goals for which we use medicine "are morally good or bad … depends upon whether they fulfill the ends for which medicine exists and which define it qua medicine." 68 When the "ends, purposes, and goals" of a proposed use of medical knowledge conflict, they "can only be resolved by reference to a primary defining good, which takes priority over other goods. administering a non-therapeutic research intervention is arguably worse than participation in an execution if evaluated according to medicine's "essence": the non-therapeutic intervention is not motivated by a desire to heal or reduce a risk of pain; and because the research setting is similar to clinical care, it often causes the therapeutic misconception. 76 Condemned inmates, on the other hand, have no misconception regarding the purpose of the lethal injection procedure. Second, consider forensic psychiatry. Imagine a capital defendant who wishes to offer mitigating evidence that he suffered from a serious mental impairment at the time of his crime. A forensic psychiatrist can use her medical training to examine this defendant, then testify that the proffered mitigating circumstance is unsubstantiated. 77 The psychiatric examination had no healing purpose, and its outcome ultimately harmed the defendant.
Pellegrino's account -in some parts of his writings -of what makes a physician act unethical seems mistaken. On his account, what makes a physician act wrongful is that it that it conflicts with the universal essence of medicine. However, his view cannot account for the truth that when a physician violates a patient's legitimate expectations, the physician has not only done something wrong, but has wronged the patient. What makes a physician's violation of trust wrongful is that it disrespects the patient's value as a person, as one to whom a duty was owed.
Common moral principles regarding promise-keeping and meeting others' legitimate expectations justify this conclusion. But, despite Pellegrino's apt description of the clinical encounter, he often denies that the wrongfulness of such acts is explained by their violation of common moral principles (such as "one should keep one's promises" and "one should not exploit others' vulnerabilities"). 78 He argues that the foundation of a physician's duties cannot be adequately justified by Kantian considerations regarding the patient's value as a person. 79 Rather, Pellegrino argues, the source of medical ethical duties is "in the nature of [medical] professions, in what is distinctive about them and the good at which they aim." 80 But the implication is that the feature of a physician's wrongful act which makes it wrongful is that it conflicts with some Platonic essence of medicine, as if something were owed to medicine's essential nature.
In other parts of his work, Pellegrino offers a more plausible basis for the Hippocratic ethic: "The vulnerability of the patient, and the trust patients must ultimately place in the physician's skill, are the foundation for the obligation to be competent in performance as well as in knowledge." 81 On this more plausible account, the Hippocratic ethic is justified by the general moral obligation to respect persons, applied to the specific context in which vulnerable persons legitimately expect a physician's good will. In light of our earlier observation though, the respect owed to a death-sentenced inmate does not justify an absolute prohibition on participation: the physician can respect the inmate by trying to reduce the risk of pain.
Acting in the State's, Not Individual's, Interests
Other opponents of physician participation describe lethal injection as "non-medical" because it is performed for the state's interests, not the individual's. Now stipulate for argument's sake that the death penalty is morally justified because it effectively deters homicides more effectively than other means. If a physician has the social obligation to report an infectious disease to preserve public health even though the report provides no direct benefit to the relevant patient, then participation in a lethal injection protocol could be less ethically problematic: the physician would be serving the public good (according to our stipulation) by lending physician's cultural authority to the procedure, and bestowing at least some benefit on the condemned inmate (reducing the risk of suffering). In addition, if societal interests can justify limits on the pursuit of patient best interests, then it is reasonable that a societal interest could be so strong as to require or permit a physician to use her skills for First, note crucial differences between medical research and clinical care. Because the purpose of research is to produce generalizable knowledge, physicians necessarily treat patientsubjects differently than clinical care patients. In clinical care, a doctor orders treatments and diagnostic tests for an individual patient based on the needs and characteristics of that individual.
The physician's duty is to tailor the course of treatment or series of diagnostic measures according to the individual's needs. 90 In research, however, valid scientific results require controlled experimentation, which implies that a protocol's scientific design determines treatment and diagnostic measures, often precluding individualized tailoring. 91 To secure scientifically valid results, some protocols limit treatments to those prescribed by protocol regardless of whether an individual patient-subject's well-being would be maximized by a tailored course of treatment. 92 In addition, protocols often require patient-subjects to undergo non-therapeutic procedures that are necessary to measure study outcomes yet present pain and/or risk of other harm, even though such procedures are not clinically indicated for each patientsubject. 93 In clinical care, a physician may perform or recommend a lumbar puncture, biopsy, CT scan, or other medical procedure only if its risks are outweighed by potential benefit to the patient. But in research, these procedures are used for scientific purposes without contribution to the patient-subjects' well-being. Even in therapeutic research, doctors expose patient-subjects to risks that are for the good of society, not to benefit the individual.
Yet professional medical organizations do not call for physicians to halt clinical research.
Moreover, law permits exposing patient-subjects to limited risk for the good of others. The federal regulations state that to approve research, an institutional review board must find that "[r]isks to subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, and the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result." 94 In other words, research is approvable even if it presents risks to patient-subjects that are not outweighed by potential direct benefit to its patient-subjects; the importance of generalizable knowledge is placed on the benefit side of the scales.
Why is physician participation in this activity morally justified? We need to explain why the Hippocratic ethic does not bind physician-researchers in the research setting.
Any satisfactory answer must begin, though not end, with recognizing the distinct and normatively significant goal of research. 95 The production of generalizable medical knowledge has great social value, which provides powerful reason to search for an ethically acceptable way for physicians to pursue that goal while respecting patient-subjects and safeguarding the medical profession's primary identity. Regardless of whether exposing persons to some research risks for the good of others is ultimately justifiable, it is crucial to recognize why we have good reason to articulate ethical principles for physician-researchers that deviate from the Hippocratic ethic. We have good reasons to permit physicians to expose patient-subjects to some limited and reasonable risk in research because of (a) the significant social value of generalizable medical knowledge, the goal of research, and (b) the significant social value of having physicians involved in the production of that end.
If pursuing the goals of research cannot be done without disrespecting patient-subjects as persons, then physician-researchers may not deviate from the Hippocratic ethic. However, as it turns out, it is ethically acceptable for physician-researchers to expose patient-subjects, in many circumstances, to some limited risk for the good of others. A distinct set of ethical standards for research exists that is sufficient for respecting patient-subjects without endangering physicians' core identity. Though we cannot and need not detail here all obligations owed to patient-subjects, they include duties which aim to protect patient-subjects from exploitation and unjustifiable harm: 96 Physician-researchers must minimize risks to patient-subjects and ensure that those risks are proportionate to the potential benefits to them and society. Accordingly, physicianresearchers must protect patient-subjects from risks that are unnecessary for answering a socially valuable and scientifically important question. To respect the autonomy of potential patientsubjects, physician-investigators must disclose conflicts of interest and provide true and digestible information about the protocol, including its purpose, potential risks and benefits, and alternatives in the clinical care settings. Physician-researchers must invite potential patientsubjects based on scientific objectives, not on vulnerability or privilege. These and other obligations demonstrate a respectful stance towards research participants without binding investigators to the Hippcratic ethic.
Implications for Physicians and Lethal Injection
The great social value of research and of having physicians participate are normatively significant: they provide strong reason to divorce the ethics of research from the ethics of clinical care, given that the latter would prohibit physicians from involvement in many valuable protocols. Accordingly, to see the connection between the ethics of physician participation in executions and the morality of capital punishment, let us stipulate again that the practice of capital punishment has great social value, whether because it is required by justice, reduces the number of murder victims better than other deterrents, or both. 97 Moreover, let us stipulate that it is valuable to have physicians involved in lethal injection because physicians do reduce the risk of undue suffering.
These stipulations, if true, would significantly strengthen the case for physician involvement. They provide good reason to construe the ethics of physician involvement differently than the ethics of clinical care. As with medical research, though, we would have to determine whether physician involvement is consistent with the duties owed to the condemned prisoners. Our earlier discussion is relevant here. Assuming (based on the stipulation) that the execution itself does not violate the inmate's rights, then physician participation, aimed at reducing his risk of suffering, would not disrespect the prisoner, unless, perhaps, the inmate did not want a physician involved.
One might object that intentionally exposing a research subject to risks posed by nonclinically-indicated biopsies, lumbar puncture, or other research risks is morally distant from participating in a practice that deliberately kills. Administering a lethal injection intentionally is different than intentionally exposing someone to a low risk of serious harm. But one point of our discussion of clinical research is that if the practice of punishment is of great social value and morally justified, physicians need not construe the practice's goal as "killing" any more than they should construe medical research's goal as "exposing people to risks that are not in their best self-interest to bear." The important goal of research is to produce valuable knowledge. The (stipulated) important goal of the practice of lethal injection would be to serve justice, save innocent lives, or whatever end allegedly justifies its existence.
The objection, though, is worth contemplating further. It highlights that it would be more difficult psychologically for physicians, on average, to administer a lethal injection than a nonclinically-indicated biopsy, given the way physicians are socialized by the profession. That physicians are trained to adhere to the Hippocratic ethic is good for society. But the fortunate fact that physicians generally would find it more difficult psychologically to administer a lethal injection only speaks in favor of not requiring any particular doctor to participate. No law or institution should ever force a physician to provide his or her skills to an execution. Not requiring a particular physician to participate is different than permitting doctors to do so.
Doctors' Cultural Authority and the Morality of Capital Punishment
The morality of capital punishment is also relevant to the ethical stance against physician participation because of concern that physician presence adds legitimacy to the practice.
Jonathan Groner, an opponent of physician participation, argues that medicalization of executions legitimizes the practice in the same disturbing way that "[m]edicalization allowed Nazi physicians -and ordinary citizens -to endorse the necessity of killing." 98 Groner cites a Nazi doctor who claimed that some people represent a "gangrenous appendix in the body of mankind," and therefore must be removed. 99 A California court argued similarly that a murderer is a "cancer on society" that must be surgically eliminated. 100 Groner realizes that these rationalizations offered by the Nazis and the court "are … used to justify capital punishment, regardless of the execution method." 101 His argument against physician involvement is that lethal injection, because of its medical appearance, has made this type of reasoning more compelling. Physicians who participate in lethal injection could argue that the procedure is clinical and therefore humane to the prisoner, and, for the victim's family and community, it relieves pain, ends suffering, and brings healing and closure.
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Let us concede that physician participation and medical language describing executions make pro-death penalty arguments "more compelling." These stipulated facts would speak against physician involvement in lethal injection only if there is something morally questionable about the death penalty. If the death penalty truly is required by justice, then making pro-death-penalty arguments more compelling would be morally good rather than problematic. On the other hand, if capital punishment is barbaric or otherwise morally unjustified, then physicians have strong reason not to lend their "cultural cachet" 103 to it. Below we will discuss whether that strong consideration against participation would outweigh the reason to help lower the inmate's risk of suffering. Here, it is important to acknowledge the multiple ways in which the arguments against participation depend on an assessment of the death penalty's value.
Assessing Arguments in Support of Physician Participation
Proponents of physician participation do not advocate a redefinition of core principles of medical ethics. They argue that respect for the condemned prisoner -a desire to act in his best interestsjustifies physician involvement. Though this pro-participation argument is strong, we have seen that the public good should also have purchase on the scope of physician obligations. In some contexts, like medical research, the social value of medical research provides good reason to investigate whether doctors may ethically use their medical skills on individuals in ways that cause some harm or risk. In other contexts, reasons related to the social good might imply that physicians should abstain from offering their skills to a practice, even though participation would advance the best interests of a potential individual patient. With regard to executions, proponents of physician participation must consider societal reasons for doctors not to participate, and such deliberation requires consideration of capital punishment's moral status.
Complicity and the Morality of Capital Punishment
To begin, if the death penalty is immoral, then willing participation in an execution represents complicity in an immoral act and, as such, would be prima facie wrongful. A discussion of complicity within criminal law will be helpful.
The legal doctrine of accomplice liability recognizes that an agent may be blameworthy for the acts of another. When an agent chooses to assist another's wrongful act, she voluntarily identifies herself with the wrongdoer's actions, at least to some degree. Even if one's motivation for assisting is beneficent, she cannot escape the social fact that intentional assistance in wrongdoing expresses some identification with the wrongful act. As such, complicity in wrongdoing is prima facie wrongful. A complicit agent may have an excuse (e.g., insanity, duress), but otherwise her assistance may be morally permissible only if a justification exists for committing the prima facie wrong of assisting in wrongdoing.
Assuming that complicity for moral wrongdoing parallels the legal doctrine, complicity involves assisting a primary actor (actus reus) while having a proscribed state of mind (mens rea). The previous paragraph briefly touched on the latter requirement: as a general rule, accomplice liability involves intentional assistance. If a physician intentionally assists an execution, and all executions are wrongful, then the physician possesses the mens rea for complicity in moral wrongdoing.
However, as evidenced by our moral experience and many aspects of criminal law, 104 an agent's motives also impact the moral quality of his assistance. It matters morally whether a defendant killed his father because he was motivated to collect insurance money or to honor his father's request not to live if unable to care for himself. 105 Also, as evidenced by the necessity defense, motive can also serve to exculpate an agent from liability if she committed the prima facie wrongful act with the purpose of avoiding an even greater harm. 106 Thus, a physician's motivation in participating in an execution is relevant to determining the moral status of her involvement. If capital punishment is immoral and participation implies complicity, the physician's degree of moral blameworthiness (if blameworthy at all) will depend, in part, on her motivation, such as whether she participates solely to minimize the inmate's risk of pain or to inflict the punishment herself.
With regard to actual assistance, the degree to which an agent assists in wrongdoing matters morally. But, again assuming a parallel between morality and criminal law, even trivial assistance is sufficient to establish accomplice liability. 107 Encouragement through psychological or moral support suffices. 108 Physician involvement does lend moral support to the practice. This fact explains why death penalty proponents -at least initially -sought physician involvement and increased medicalization of executions. Their aim was to make the public as comfortable as possible with executions. Presumably, physician involvement can strengthen or maintain public support for executions by creating the image of a caring doctor overseeing a hospital-type procedure in which an inmate peacefully falls asleep. At present, many death penalty supporters argue against the need for physician involvement because of inmates' litigation claim that physician participation is constitutionally required. But putting aside the constitutional claim, the involvement of doctors serves the state by lending an aura of legitimacy to the practice. 109 One might object that physicians do not really assist the perpetuation of executions because few, if any, voters would change their opinion about the death penalty should physicians not participate; states will continue to execute prisoners regardless of the means of execution.
The objection essentially is that physician assistance at an execution could not qualify as immoral complicity because a physician's involvement would not be a but-for cause of the death penalty's persistence. However, the objection is unpersuasive because causation is not an element of accomplice liability. Even if a defendant's assistance was not a but-for cause of the principal actor's crime, the defendant is complicit in the crime. 110 Complicity implies blameworthiness for the acts of others. The only causation analysis relevant to complicity regards the causal relationship between the principal agent's actions and the prohibited harm. If an accomplice provides either a weapon or psychological support to another who plans a robbery, the accomplice is morally blameworthy for the robber's crime even if the robber would have committed the crime without the accomplice's support. The state need not prove that the defendant's assistance was a but-for cause of the crime.
Kenneth Baum, a proponent of physician involvement, agrees that "physician participation may have the consequence of providing a surface appearance of humanity or adding an aura of medical legitimacy to the execution process [,] " and that " [t] his is undoubtedly a troubling proposition." 111 However, Baum responds that this "troubling proposition" is only a "concern with the death penalty itself, not physician participation." 112 Baum continues: "The unease that underlies this potential whitewashing of the core identity of the death penalty concerns the morality of any state-sanctioned taking of life, not the involvement of physicians in carrying out that penalty." 113 Baum joins the list of commentators deeming the morality of capital punishment irrelevant to the ethics of physician participation. But our discussion of complicity demonstrates why the morality of capital punishment is crucial to the ethics of physician participation. Baum states that the "physician's obligation is to the patient, not to the political agenda of special interest groups -not even to the American Medical Association." 114 Baum fails to realize that the morality of the death penalty is relevant, not because a physician owes anything to the "political agenda" of any organization, but because physicians have obligations to their fellow citizens. If the death penalty is unjust (or worse), then participating doctors will be complicit in unjust (or worse) actions, which means, at the least, they commit a very serious prima facie wrong.
Article 3 of United Nations Resolution 37 reflects this position regarding complicity and the moral status of the death penalty.
It is a gross contravention of medical ethics, as well as an offence under applicable international instruments, for health personnel, particularly physicians, to engage, actively or passively, in acts which constitute participation in, complicity in, incitement to or attempts to commit torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
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Obviously, many opponents of the death penalty, including some former U.S. Supreme Court justices, argue that the death penalty is cruel, inhuman, and degrading. 116 Deciding whether a participating physician is complicit in wrongdoing requires assessment of their claims.
Slippery Slope Concerns and the Morality of Capital Punishment
Some critics of physician involvement argue that physician participation damages medicine's caring ethos. Some suggest, implicitly or explicitly, that the damage to that caring ethos leads to a slippery slope where we inevitably see Nazis and their atrocities at the bottom. 117 Condemning physician participation, Alfred Freedman and Abraham Halpern, write:
The history of the twentieth century gives us many examples of how compromises lead us down a slippery slope to disaster and abandonment of ethical principles. The rationale that physicians should assist in the administration of justice, insofar as capital punishment is concerned, is frighteningly reminiscent of how German physicians justified their involvement in the torture and killing of thousands of innocent human beings and carried out the Nazi programs of sterilization and "euthanasia" by murdering countless children and adults. 118 Baum rejects this "slippery slope" concern. However, contrary to his claims, his defense of physician participation implicitly appeals to moral judgments about the social worth and moral status of capital punishment. Baum identifies some moral distinctions between Nazi doctors and American death penalty: capital punishment has been democratically endorsed in death penalty jurisdictions, as opposed to policies in Nazi Germany; a death penalty jurisdiction's goal is to give effect to the voters' will; death row inmates had trials with the protection of Constitutional rights; and "[w]e do not arbitrarily choose whom to execute." 119 Baum's observations are undoubtedly morally relevant to a comparison of the American death penalty and the horrors of Nazi Germany. Nonetheless, Baum's response fails to recognize that the death penalty can still be barbaric and unjust even if it is not the moral equivalent of Nazi atrocities. Even if not on par with Nazi atrocities, the capital system could be sufficiently unjust to give doctors strong reason not to be complicit in the practice or seen as endorsing it.
Is the death penalty sufficiently unjust to give physicians reason to avoid involvement?
Baum does not explicitly address that question, but some of his arguments entail his answer. In his response to the "Nazi slippery slope concerns," he writes that "[w]e do not arbitrarily choose whom to execute." 120 Baum acknowledges that studies show that arbitrary factors (such as the victim's race) affect how the death penalty is distributed in the United States. But clearly he does not find the moral flaws with the American death penalty so serious as to require physicians to disassociate themselves with the practice and signal to society that it is too unjust for their participation. 121 He further states that "as long as state ordered executions persist, physicians' primary ethical obligation is to make them as painless and humane as possible for the condemned." 122 But if the death penalty is gravely unjust and perhaps evil, and if physician involvement only slightly reduces the risk of suffering, then physicians' primary obligation might be outweighed by their obligations to humanity to take a stand against injustice and avoid complicity. Baum's defense of physician participation -like the arguments of his opponentsrests on his perceptions about the morality of the American death penalty.
Is the Moral Status of Capital Punishment All That Matters?
Recall that some supporters of physician participation argue that lethal injection is a non-medical procedure and, as such, the If the society is correct in executing criminals, surely it is within its right to construct the role of physician professional in such a way that some of its members . . . can participate in executions. On the other hand, if the society should not be executing any criminals, then it should not formulate any of its medical professional roles in a way that they include physician participation in execution. The more the execution looks like an anesthetic, the less comfortable patients are likely to be with anesthesia. Surgery is already a frightening time and one in which patients need to trust their anesthesiologist. 
Practical Implications
For Lawmakers
Should legislators require or ban participation by a physician or other medical health professional on its jurisdiction's execution team? A separate legal question is whether state medical boards should ever discipline doctors for participation. However, as Ty Alper demonstrates, it is unlikely that any state medical board in a capital jurisdiction has legal authority to discipline a physician for participation. 130 In addition, even if a medical board had that authority, it should not discipline physicians for participating to reduce an inmate's risk of suffering, given the complexity of the ethical question and the reasonableness of concluding that it is morally permissible to participate with that motivation. Thus, the practical question is whether legislatures should direct their respective departments of corrections to include or ban physicians or other medical professionals from execution teams.
The foregoing arguments strongly support the proposition that legislators who favor the death penalty should require participation of physicians or other highly trained medical professionals. Assuming, as they believe, that the death penalty is morally justified and socially valuable, then the case against physician participation is very weak. First, if the death penalty truly does advance justice, then it is good if physicians lend their cultural authority to the practice and ease citizens' consciences about the execution procedure. Second, it is reasonable to conclude that the respect owed to the condemned inmate permits a physician to try to reduce the risk of suffering. Third, the arguments examined in Part III against physician participationbased on an alleged morality internal to medicine, on being a primary cause of death, and on the non-medical status of lethal injection -are unpersuasive.
In addition, pro-death penalty legislators need not be moved by a concern for the public's trust in anesthesiologists. Of course, any legislator should want to protect the physician-patient relationship and avoid causing undue anxiety for surgery patients. However, these concerns do not support a ban on physician participation. Ironically, the position of the American Medical Association and other professional organizations actually solidifies the case in support of physician participation because it alleviates these concerns. When news outlets publicize the participation of a physician in an execution, they also publicize the fact that medical organizations oppose such participation. The professional codes of ethics allow the public to view physicians who participate as rare outliers who reject their profession's norms. Thus, the codes of ethics guard against any erosion of public trust in anesthesiologists and other physicians that otherwise might be caused by physician participation.
For anti-death-penalty lawmakers in capital jurisdictions, the practical implications are less clear and more complex. Assuming that the death penalty is immoral and anesthesiologists could reduce the risk of suffering, a satisfactory ethical analysis nonetheless would be complex and depend on many related details. For example, the degree to which the death penalty is unjustified -whether the moral status of capital punishment is a close case (it is morally impermissible but barely so) 131 or whether it represents an absolutely evil and barbaric practice 132 --would matter. The degree of the death penalty's wrongfulness would then have to be balanced against the degree to which an anesthesiologist's involvement reduces the inmate's risk of torture. If the death penalty is barbaric and physicians only slightly reduce the risk of unnecessary suffering, then the case for banning physician participation is very strong: in those circumstances, we should not want physicians lending their cultural authority to the death penalty and easing the public's conscience about executions. On the other hand, if the death penalty is unjustified but barely so, and if physician involvement significantly reduces the risk to each inmate, then the case for physician involvement is stronger. On those stipulated facts, the decision for the anti-death-penalty legislator is more difficult and sensitive to the details. No algorithm reveals the right answer.
For Professional Medical Organizations
Should medical professional organizations change their ethical codes to acknowledge the relationship between the ethics of participation and the moral status of the death penalty? If the AMA wants to retain its ethical ban on participation, should it remove from its code any suggestion that the morality of the death penalty is irrelevant? Before directly addressing this question, let us acknowledge that such organizations do not have self-interested reason to take a particular stand on capital punishment. The AMA -the largest association within organized medicine -holds out itself to prospective members as an aggressive advocate for physicians' interests and provider of benefits to physicians in their daily practice. 133 It specifies its core mission as "promot[ing] the science and art of medicine and the betterment of public health." 134 Insofar as the AMA hopes to represent as many doctors as possible, it has good reason to avoid alienating any physicians with a stance on capital punishment or any other controversial political issue. The expertise of organized physicians also fails to provide reason for the AMA to take a stand on capital punishment or other political issue apart from its relevance to medicine.
Professional medical societies have good reasons to develop ethical standards for medical practice 135 based on their knowledge and critical experience regarding the practice of medicine.
But they have no special interest in, knowledge of, or insight into the death penalty.
In addition, it is also important to consider that physicians and other health professionals are participating in executions. Given that fact, these organizations have good reason not to change their codes. Their ethical stance prevents the potential negative effects to the physicianpatient relationship and public trust that worry Dr. Guidry and other opponents of physician participation. Thus, even if the death penalty is morally justified, the primary mission of these organizations supports their clear and simple ban on participation.
Medical professional organizations would have additional reasons not to change their codes if the capital punishment is an immoral practice. Condemning the participation of medical health professionals is the closest these organizations can come to condemning the death penalty without doing so explicitly and alienating actual and potential members. 136 Second, their ethical ban would effectively represent a refusal, on the part of their members, to be complicit in the practice. Finally, these ethical bans provide a readily accessible defense for any physicians solicited to participate. 
